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Introduction 
 Starting with our first email from Professor Wefing, the Fall 2014 U.S. Supreme Court 
class at Seton Hall University School of Law was posited the following: “Does the Court follow 
its own precedent?  Is stare decisis really relevant or is it simply used to help justify a decision and 
rejected whenever the Court wants to reach a different result or the Court has changed and has 
different views?”1  Admittedly, I put these questions to the side for some time, but I am elated to 
have the opportunity to revisit them.  This Advanced Writing Requirement paper explores stare 
decisis and its role in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  But it also does more that have an academic 
discussion on a judicial doctrine of consistency.  In particular, I explore Associate Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy’s view of stare decisis in constitutional cases.  
 As a guide to the multitude of pages to follow, here is a brief outline of my paper:  Part I 
discusses Justice Kennedy’s personal history, an intellectual life filled with a variety of 
experiences that likely shaped his middle-man position on the Court; Part II delves into the doctrine 
of stare decisis, and Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudential approach that evades many a scholar; Part 
III addresses particular case law, as crafted by Justice Kennedy, that best reveals his approach to 
the doctrine of stare decisis.  In the end, I conclude that although Justice Kennedy attempts to 
follow a strong doctrine of stare decisis, he capitalizes on what I call “his exception” to stare 
decisis that allows him to escape the binding nature of stare decisis.  Justice Kennedy’s stance on 
constitutional stare decisis not only adds to his very complex, confusing jurisprudence, but also 
allows him to substantially effect constitutional principles in controversial cases to come. 
I. Personal History of Justice Kennedy 
                                                 
1 Email from John Wefing, Distinguished Prof. of NJ Law and History, to U.S. Supreme Court 
class (Aug. 5, 2014, 15:34 EST) (on file with author). 
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 Anthony McLeod Kennedy was born on July 23, 1936.2  He grew up as the middle child 
of three children in the Kennedy household.3  His upbringing in Sacramento, California is said to 
have shaped Justice Kennedy’s “approach to life that suggests a small-town innocence.”4  His 
father, Anthony J. Kennedy, was a local attorney and lobbyist for different businesses to the 
California state legislature.5  His mother, Gladys McLeod, was an active part of the Sacramento 
civic activity scene.6   
 Because of the active social role his father played in California politics, Justice Kennedy 
grew up with “a [household] rule that the table was to be set with a couple extra places each night 
for dinner because on any given night he [Justice Kennedy’s father] might bring clients or friends 
home with him.”7  Yet, Justice Kennedy was not a particularly social child.8  The scrawny, young 
Justice Kennedy spent most of his time running home after school to read books.9  However, 
Justice Kennedy’s quiet and introverted demeanor provided a unique opportunity to join the 
California legal and political scene.  Justice Kennedy’s father took him on trips to attend trials in 
Northern California and arranged a page-boy job for him at the California State Senate.10  Justice 
                                                 
2 The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, Anthony M. Kennedy, 
http://www.oyez.com/justices/anthony_m_kennedy (last visited Sept. 2, 2014); Anne Jelliff, 
Catholic Values, Human Dignity, and the Moral Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s Approach to the Constitution, 76 Alb. L. Rev. 335, 337 (2013). 
3 The Oyez Project (citing Robert Reinhold, Restrained Pragmatist: Anthony M. Kennedy, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 12, 1987, at A1). 
4 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 337. 
5 The Oyez Project, supra note 2. 
6 Id. 
7 Justice Anthony Kennedy, The Justice of the United States Supreme Court, U.S. Supreme 
Court Case Tracker: Supreme Court Review, Updates on Our Nation’s Highest Court, 
http://www.http://supremecourtreview.com/default/justice/index/id/34 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) 
(hereinafter “Supreme Court Review”). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy: “They made up a job for me at the state legislature.  I was the 
only page boy the State Senate ever had.  I was the page boy there for a number of years…I 
started in the fourth grade and did it through the eighth grade, so I was this young, little kid.  It 
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Kennedy also spent some of his childhood summers working in the oil fields, a job he credits for 
teaching him more about life than his page-boy job.11  
 Justice Kennedy’s formal education began at a local public high school in Sacramento, 
California.12  After his high school graduation, Justice Kennedy attended Stanford University and 
spent a year of his studies at the London School of Economics.13  He earned both his A.B. and Phi 
Beta Kappa key in 1958.14  Like many of the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court today, Justice 
Kennedy attended Harvard Law School and graduated cum laude in his distinguished law school 
class.15  Following graduation from Harvard Law School, he worked as an associate for a law firm 
in San Francisco, California.16  In 1963, Justice Kennedy’s father died unexpectedly.17  Justice 
Kennedy decided to move back to Sacramento to take over his father’s business; this decisive 
move became a personal and professional decision that shaped the rest of his life.18  That same 
                                                 
probably stunted my growth because of all the cigar smoke they had in those days.  As a result, 
I knew Earl Warren very well, on a somewhat professional basis.  Professional, as in I was a 
nine-year-old page boy and he was the Governor.  We knew his children and played in the 
Governor’s Mansion and so forth.  I have a letter I’ve given to the Supreme Court Historical 
Society, in which he wrote and said ‘You’re going to go very far in government.’ I’m very proud 
of the fact that I knew well someone who later became the Chief Justice of the United States.”). 
11 Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy: “I got jobs in the oil fields.  My uncle was in the oil business, and 
so at the age of I think 14, I got my first job kind of cleaning up around the oil rig.  And then, I 
learned how to do that, and I went to Montana, Canada, New Orleans.  I worked on a drilling 
barge in the Gulf in the summer.  You could make a lot of money in those days, by the 
standards of those days, in the oil fields, and so I saved that to help for my education, and I 
loved it.  I think I maybe learned more in the oil fields than I did in the State Senate. I think 
there’s a lot of wisdom in the working man and the working woman.  I think they’re very 
concerned about what the country is like, what their life should be like.  And I think that taught 
me a lot, because I was the butt of many jokes when I was a little kid working with these high-
powered people in the oil fields, and I had to learn to adjust to that and try to pull my own 
weight.”). 
12 The Oyez Project, supra note 2. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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year, Justice Kennedy married Mary Davis, a childhood friend with a Masters in Education from 
Stanford University and a teacher and librarian in the Sacramento public school system.19  The two 
later had three children together.20 
 Once back in Sacramento, Justice Kennedy quickly stepped into his father’s business and 
political network of connections and contacts.21  The California legal and political community 
realized that the young attorney had as much, if not more, promise and talent than his well-
respected father. 22   Justice Kennedy grew into “a talent for socializing” and quickly made 
influential friends among the state politicians.23  One friend, Ed Meese, represented the California 
District Attorney Association in the mid-1960’s and then worked alongside California Governor 
Ronald Reagan.24  Because of Mr. Meese and Justice Kennedy’s similar age and up-brining, the 
two struck a friendship and never lost touch with each other throughout their lives.25    In 1973, 
Justice Kennedy was recruited by Mr. Meese and the Reagan Gubernatorial Administration to draft 
a constitutional amendment that would cut taxes and spending for the State of California.26  The 
amendment was not approved by the California voters, but did lay the foundation for a similar 
proposal that was later adopted.27   
                                                 
19 Supreme Court Review, supra note 7. 
20 The Oyez Project, supra note 2. 
21 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 337-38. 
22 The Oyez Project, supra note 2. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (“Meese left to work for then-Governor Reagan in 1966 and Kennedy continued his work 
as an attorney and lobbyist.  The two men did not lose touch with each other, however, and 
Kennedy continued to help Meese and Reagan in small capacities.”). 
26 Id.; Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 338. 
27 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 338. 
   5 
 Not too long after, Governor Reagan recommended Justice Kennedy to fill a vacancy on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.28  This recommendation was likely because the 
Governor was impressed with Justice Kennedy’s work on the state constitutional amendment.29  
President Gerald Ford agreed with the recommendation and Justice Kennedy joined the Ninth 
Circuit in 1975 “as the youngest federal judge of his day.”30  The Carter Administration appointed 
a sweeping number of liberal judges to various courts, which helped to form Justice Kennedy’s 
reputation as “the head of a conservative minority in the Court of Appeals.”31  However, Justice 
Kennedy was commended early in his judgeship by liberals for his “method of addressing each 
issue in a narrow case-by-case manner.”32   
 It is also worth mentioning that while still working in private practice and throughout his 
judicial career, Justice Kennedy was also Professor Kennedy - he held a position as professor at 
McGeorge School of Law of the University of the Pacific.33  Justice Kennedy taught Constitutiona l 
Law and held this position with great pride until he took his seat on the U.S. Supreme Court.34 
 Justice Kennedy’s assent to the U.S. Supreme Court started on June 26, 1987, the day 
Justice Lewis Powell resigned from the Court.35  President Ronald Reagan promptly nominated 
Robert Bork to fill the position.36  Mr. Bork was “an ornery intellectual, with a scraggily beard and 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.; The Oyez Project, supra note 2.  At this time, Justice Kennedy was around thirty-nine 
years old. 
31 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 338. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 338. 
34 Id. at 338.  See also Symposium, The Evolution of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s 
Jurisprudence - Introduction, 44 McGeorge L. Rev. iii (2013). 
35 Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court, 22 (First Anchor 
Books Edition 2007).  It is interesting to note that Justice Powell was considered the “swing 
justice of his day” and the fifth vote for the majority in some controversial cases.  See id.  
36 Id. 
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without any natural ethnic or religions political base.  For Democrats, in short, he was an invit ing 
target.”37  Moderate Democrats in the South had issue with what their constituents considered as 
Mr. Bork’s “cultural conservatism.”38 Because of the heated political confirmation process, Mr. 
Bork lost the Senate confirmation by a vote of 58 to 42.39  President Reagan was enraged by the 
Democrats in the Senate and vowed to nominate someone even more objectionable than the last.40  
His second pick was Douglas H. Ginsburg, a Reagan-appointed D.C. Circuit judge that was a 
younger, more conservative nominee than Robert Bork.41  However, President Reagan’s strategy 
quickly folded when it was revealed “that the law-and-order judge had smoked marijuana as a 
professor at Harvard Law School.”42 
 At this point, Howard Baker, President Reagan’s White House Chief of Staff, “just wanted 
to pick someone who would be confirmed—a conservative, to be sure, but not necessarily someone 
who would please [Mr.] Meese [now at the Department of Justice for the Reagan Administra t ion 
and still Justice Kennedy’s close friend] and other true believers” of a strong conservative 
agenda.”43  Judge Anthony M. Kennedy of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
chosen as the next nominee — perhaps because he was known to be a conservative judge in the 
Ninth Circuit, but also admired by liberals for his “pragmatic decision-making” abilities.44 Justice 
Kennedy passed Senate confirmation with little resistance on February 3, 1988. 45   Justice 
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 Perhaps a polite way of saying that Mr. Bork sounded like a racist. 
39 Id. at 23. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Supreme Court Review, supra note 7. 
45 Id.; The Oyez Project, supra note 2; Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 388-89. 
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Kennedy’s first day as an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court was February 18, 1988.46  
Today, Justice Kennedy sits in the third-most coveted seat47 on the U.S. Supreme Court - to Chief 
Justice Roberts’ left-hand side as the second most senior justice.48 
II. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence 
 Many legal scholars have questioned the role precedent plays in the minds of the justices 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.   However, the word “precedent” needs to be parsed out to begin the 
discussion on Justice Kennedy’s use of the doctrine of stare decisis.  Then, a background 
understanding of Justice Kennedy’s general jurisprudence best provides a backdrop for his 
authored cases in which he specifically addresses stare decisis. 
 
A. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
 “Precedent” is a broad term, used to include both vertical precedent and horizonta l 
precedent.49  Vertical precedent is “the obligation of a lower court to follow the rulings of a higher 
court in its own chain of command.”50  Horizontal precedent tends to be not so absolute and is the 
“obligation of a court to follow its own previous decisions.”51  Because the U.S. Supreme Court is 
the highest and final court in the United States, a discussion of vertical precedent is not as vibrant 
as a discussion of horizontal precedent.52  When referencing the Supreme Court’s use of previous 
                                                 
46 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 389. 
47 I assume that the first most coveted seat would be that of Chief Justice Roberts, the second 
seat being that of Justice Scalia, who the first most senior member of the Court and seated to 
the Chief Justice’s right-hand side. 
48 Supreme Court Review, supra note 7. 
49 Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 Ga. St. 
U. L. Rev. 381, 385 (2007). 
50 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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decisions, a type of horizontal precedent is called “stare decisis,” law Latin for “stand by the thing 
decided.”53 
 Generally speaking, stare decisis is understood as a doctrine that addresses “the judicia l 
policy of (sometimes) adhering to a prior decision irrespective of the prior decision’s legal 
correctness according to other interpretive criteria.” 54   The judicial doctrine’s central 
understanding  distinguishes it from precedent.  Precedent serves “the more modest role of 
providing relevant interpretive information…or…a starting point or baseline against which a 
departure ought to be justified or explained.”55  Stare decisis, on the other hand, is more than 
following in the same reasoning and conclusions as other cases.56  It “is a doctrine about the 
judicial policy or practice of adhering, sometimes, to a decision a court would otherwise feel fully 
justified in concluding was legally wrong.”57  Ultimately, stare decisis is a judicial doctrine that 
helps to ensure the legal consistency of the Court. 
 As strong (or as weak) as the doctrine of stare decisis may be, it is neither constitutiona lly 
required nor absolute in American jurisprudence.58  Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not 
require the adherence to precedent, outline when departure from precedent is or is not allowed, or 
grant powers to the Court to establish binding rules in prior cases that it must follow it subsequent 
cases.59  And even as a policy in which the Court subscribes, stare decisis is a flexible policy that 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 
1165, 1171 (2008). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1169-71. 
59 Id. 
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no one justice seems to strictly apply.60  Yet, the presence of stare decisis in some of the Supreme 
Court’s most controversial decisions is noteworthy and worth discussion.61  
 
B. Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence 
 To be blunt, a categorization of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence escapes all.  I cannot help 
but equate the search for his jurisprudential approach with the search for Malaysia Air Flight 370.  
Sometimes called “rudderless and unpredictable,”62 “a sphinx”63 “who trims his jurisprudentia l 
sails to what he perceives to be the prevailing political winds”64 or a “sweet mystery”65 and “a sui 
generis enigma at the heart of the modern Supreme Court.”66  Further, he has been labeled as a 
                                                 
60 Id. at 1170 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997) (collecting cases and 
stating that adherence to precedent is “not an inexorable command” but “a policy judgment”)). 
61 This paper only highlights Justice Kennedy’s use of constitutional stare decisis and not 
statutory interpretation stare decisis.  For a more complete discussion of statutory interpretation 
stare decisis, see i.e. Leegan Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899-901 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., majority); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251-53 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., majority); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
majority).  See generally Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863 (2008).  
62 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 336 (citing Richard C. Reuben, Man in the Middle, Cal. Law., Oct. 
1992, at 36). 
63 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 336 (citing Garrett Epps & Dahlia Lithwick, Will the Real Anthony 
Kennedy Please Stand Up?, Slate.com (Apr. 27, 2007, 6:01 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/04/the_sphinx_of_ 
sacramento.html). 
64 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 336 (citing Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Many Faces of “Judicial 
Restraint”, 1993 Pub. Int. L. Rev. 3, 17 (1993)). 
65 Ilya Shaprio, A Faint-Hearted Libertarian at Best: The Sweet Mystery of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 333, 360 (2009) (reviewing Helen J. Knowles, The Tie 
Goes to Freedom: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on Liberty, Rowman & Littlefield (2009)).  This 
description of Justice Kennedy is taken from an famous paragraph found in the Justice’s 
majority opinion in Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, “At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compassion of the State.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.  For criticism on the “sweet 
mystery of life” passage, see e.g. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J. 
dissenting) (characterizing the passage in Casey as “the passage that ate the rule of law”). 
66 Shapiro, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 360. 
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“constant struggle.”67 Others suggest that he “does produce the type of standard-less decisions that 
some would label inconsistent.”68  No one is able to come close to pigeon-holing Justice Kennedy.  
“Justice Kennedy is famously frustrating, pleasing some of the people all of the time and thus often 
facing the wrath of those on the short end of one of his deciding 5-4 votes.”69   
 In an attempt to articulate any type of jurisprudential approach for Justice Kennedy, some 
scholars focused on his jurisprudence in more political terms, while another scholar recognized 
the Roman Catholic influences that are found throughout his jurisprudence.70  However, these 
types of approaches are not coherent, considering Justice Kennedy’s stance on abortion in Planned 
Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, decided while a republican was president.71  One scholar tried to 
focus on Justice Kennedy’s libertarian vibes found in his authored opinions on freedom of speech, 
equal protection for sexual minorities, strict scrutiny for racial classifications, and (possibly) 
abortion, while another scholar responded to this theory with Justice Kennedy’s rather un-
libertarian emphasis in areas such as criminal law, property rights, and governmental powers.72  
Other scholars contrasted the Justice Kennedy’s ideology of the U.S. Constitution with other more 
staunch, stubborn members of the Court, but have only produced a perplexing understanding that 
is neither fully new-originalist nor truly living-constitutionalist.73  There are “weaknesses inherent 
                                                 
67 Id. at 354. 
68 Id. at 354. 
69 Id. at 351. 
70 Jelliff, 76 Alb. L. Rev. at 336 
71 Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  Republican George H.W. Bush 
was president at this time. 
72 See generally Ilya Shaprio, A Faint-Hearted Libertarian at Best: The Sweet Mystery of Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 333 (reviewing Helen J. Knowles, The Tie Goes to 
Freedom: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on Liberty, Rowman & Littlefield (2009)). 
73 Shapiro, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 337 (“While ‘the intentions and the purpose of the 
framers should prevail,’ accepting ‘that new generation yield new insights and new perspectives 
does not mean the Constitution changes.  It just means that our understanding of it changes.’”) 
(citing Helen J. Knowles, The Tie Goes to Freedom: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on Liberty 
(2009) (quoting Hearings on the Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of 
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in any unifying theory of Justice Kennedy”74 and, quite simply, Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence 
has failed everyone’s attempt at categorization.75 
 Yet the best description and understanding of Justice Kennedy is the simplest one: 
moderate.76  He is the “swing vote,”77 a “remaining centrist,”78 and “an important pivot on which 
close decisions turn.”79  Simply, Justice Kennedy is a middle man.  I wonder if his childhood 
exposure to both upperclass, conservative politics and blue-collar, union workers crafted him to 
be sympathetic to both political camps and the legal doctrines each side is likely to utilize.80  I also 
wonder whether his narrow approach of moving individual case by individual case prevents him 
from crafting a single, coherent jurisprudential approach.81   I further wonder whether Justice 
Kennedy’s replacement of another swing voter, Justice Powell, on the U.S. Supreme Court 
encouraged him to be more open in his thoughts on how to craft law and policy.82  However, all 
these considerations are not fully gratifying and I am constantly left wondering about Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence.  Even with the most recent changes to the composition of the Court, “it 
is unlikely that Justice Kennedy will shift from his role as the deciding vote in most controversia l 
cases.”83  This is the only understanding of Justice Kennedy that seems to be consistent. 
                                                 
the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 154 
(1987))).  See generally Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy’s Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 
N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 25 (2007). 
74 Shapiro, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 353 
75 Id. at 353. 
76 Supreme Court Review, supra note 7. 
77 Id. 
78 Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s Move 
Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 
25, 25 (2007). 
79 The Oyez Project, supra note 2. 
80 See supra text accompanying note 11, note 31. 
81 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
82 See supra text accompanying note 35. 
83 Shapiro, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 360. 
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III. Justice Kennedy’s Cases on Stare Decisis 
 The decisions that Justice Kennedy penned best demonstrate his views on the doctrine of 
stare decisis.  Starting with a plurality opinion in which he had a strong hand in crafting, Justice 
Kennedy attempts to follow a strong stare decisis doctrine in constitutional cases.  However, the 
placement of a particular exception to his stare decisis understanding provides Justice Kennedy 
with an opportunity to not follow precedent when he disputes fundamental points of constitutiona l 
principles.  Justice Kennedy’s stare decisis exception allows him to dispute the correctness of the 
previous opinion and, in turn, not follow stare decisis neither in practice nor principle.  This not 
only adds to Justice Kennedy’s rather perplexing jurisprudential approach, but also provides him 
with an opportunity to substantially effect future controversial constitutional cases as the Court’s 
middle-man. 
 
A. Attempts at a Strong Foundation for Stare Decisis 
 Justice Kennedy attempts to follow a strong doctrine of stare decisis.  His articulation of 
the strength of the judicial doctrine and his adherence to the Court’s previously announced 
reasoning, despite sharp criticism, are commendable.  However, Justice Kennedy’s strong 
statements on stare decisis are found in one case that reworks a precedent’s underlying 
constitutional framework and another case that overrules precedent.  These considerations coupled 
with later modifications to one constitutional framework raise red flags as to Justice Kennedy’s 
earnest efforts to adhere to a strong doctrine of stare decisis.  
   13 
 Justice Kennedy’s role in the plurality decision in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey84 
shows a strong, coherent articulation of stare decisis and its doctrinal foundation. This case has 
been dubbed “somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s first systematic attempt to set forth a 
general theory of the role of precedent and stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.”85  In Casey, 
five abortion clinics and an individual physician representing a class of physicians asked the Court 
to hold five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act as facially unconstitutional, while 
Pennsylvania, the United States and other amici curiae wanted the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade86 
in holding the Pennsylvania statute constitutional.87  Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
announced the plurality decision of the Court that the essential holding of Roe would remain intact, 
thereby upholding two provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act and finding three 
provisions unconstitutional with Casey’s announced undue burden framework.88 
 In discussing stare decisis and Roe, the plurality opinion noted the unique position in which 
the Casey Court was placed in our Nation’s legal system.89  Although stare decisis would not be 
an “inexorable command” applicable to every constitutional case, the Court would reexamine a 
prior ruling with an eye towards “prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the 
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the 
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”90  In particular, the Court would ask 
itself four core questions in deciding whether to overturn a previous ruling:  
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying 
practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance 
                                                 
84 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).   
85 Paulsen, 86 N.C. L. Rev. at 1168-69 (internal quotations omitted). 
86 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
87 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-45. 
88 Id. at 845-46, 877. 
89 Id. at 854. 
90 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling 
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related 
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule 
no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts 
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed 
the old rule of significant application or justification.91 
 
Going through each consideration articulated above and noting both the central importance of Roe 
and its evolved factual underpinnings, the Court determined that the crux of its previous decision 
would remain.92 
 Past the announced rules of how a prior decision may be overturned, three doctrinal 
foundations of stare decisis are revealed in Casey — the extensive discussion of each shows its 
importance to Justice Kennedy’s view of stare decisis.  The plurality addressed two undercurrents 
simultaneously:  maintaining the legitimacy of the Court and respecting the rule of law.  In a 
portion of its decision that contrasts its current position to that of the Court’s previous positions in 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish93 and Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,94 the Court noted the importance of 
grounding its decisions in well reasoned principles and “on the terms the Court claims for 
them…[and] not as compromises with social and political pressures[.]”95  If the Court were to 
continually overrule itself, the country would no longer believe in the Court’s good faith attempts 
to seek the right answers, thereby showing that the Court neither has good faith nor the right 
answers. 96   Further, the Court’s short term political appeasements through overruling prior 
                                                 
91 Id. at 854-55. 
92 Id. at 855-64. 
93 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (ending the eroded principles founded 
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of 
Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) that favored the theory of laissez-faire and liberty of contract 
over social regulation). 
94 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) (stopping the country’s continual wave 
of racial segregation, as first judicially recognized in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
95 Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66. 
96 Id. at 866. 
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decisions shows great disrespect for the rule of law.97  A justice may be subject to personal attacks 
for an unpopular decision, but: 
[t]o all those who will be so tested by following [the rule of law], 
the Court implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in the end a 
price be paid for nothing.  The promise of constancy, once again, 
binds its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision 
survives and the understanding of the issue has not change so 
fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete.98 
 
If the court were to “address error, if error there was, [it would come] at the cost of both profound 
and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule of 
law.”99   
 The third undercurrent — the role of correctness — cannot go unnoticed in Casey.  
Remember, the doctrine of stare decisis is supposed to, at least in theory, follow a previous 
decision regardless of its correctness.  Yet in Casey, the Court discussed Griswold v. 
Connecticut,100 Eisenstadt v. Baird,101 and Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,102 and the protections 
those cases afford to privacy, women’s liberty, and personal decisions about procreation. 103  
Although “reasonable people will have differences of opinion about these matters,” these cases 
represent “intimate views with infinite variations, and their deep, personal character underlying 
our [previous] decisions” must be respected.104  “We have no doubt as to the correctness of those 
decisions.”105 Because Roe followed those decisions by affording similar protections for personal 
                                                 
97 Id. at 866-68. 
98 Id. at 868. 
99 Id. at 869. 
100 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
101 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
102 Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
103 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851-54. 
104 Id. at 853. 
105 Id. at 852. 
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liberties and through borrowed reasoning, the plurality implicitly stated that the core of Roe was 
also correctly decided and would remain the law.106 
 The strong statements about stare decisis in Casey are telling of how Justice Kennedy 
views the importance of stare decisis in judicial analysis in controversial constitutional cases.  Four 
strict and succinct questions will mark whether the Court will overturn a previous decision, and 
those four questions will be aided by a profound respect for maintaining judicial legitimacy and 
the rule of law.  Pages are spent in Casey on the importance of these aspects in Supreme Court 
decision making.  In theory, the Court would consider the practical effects of the princip le 
previously announced.  However, the correctness of the underlying constitutional principle cannot 
completely be ignored when revisiting a controversial Supreme Court decision. 
 The same understanding of stare decisis was echoed in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas.107  In Lawrence, the Court was asked to decide whether a Texas statute that 
criminalized “homosexual conduct” violated two different portions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and whether Bowers v. Hardwick108  should be overturned.109   Justice Kennedy authored the 
majority opinion that held that the Texas statute was unconstitutional and that Bowers should be 
overturned.110  Justice Kennedy followed the same stare decisis analysis as in Casey to determine 
that Bowers was no longer good law.111  In fact, Justice Kennedy cited to Casey to demonstrate 
how Bowers was no longer valid and why stare decisis could not save the bad precedent.112  Justice 
                                                 
106 Id. at 853. 
107 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
108 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
109 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
110 Id. at 577-78. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 577 (“In Casey we noted that when a court is asked to overrule a precedent 
recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of that 
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Kennedy was consistent in his analysis of stare decisis in both Casey and Lawrence.  Like Casey, 
the lengthy discussion of precedent’s fallacies in Lawrence is noteworthy.113  Yet different then 
Casey, Justice Kennedy determined in Lawrence that precedent found in “Bowers was not correct 
when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.”114 
 Despite the strong articulation of stare decisis in Casey, the role of correctness in Casey 
and Lawrence raise serious doubt as to Justice Kennedy’s strict adherence to a strong judicia l 
doctrine of consistency.  Justice Kennedy’s further modifications of the undue burden framework 
in his later decisions on abortion further cast doubt on his attempt to follow a strong doctrine of 
stare decisis.  Two later decisions on abortion discussed whether a state or the federal government 
can restrict the types of processes used by physicians to perform an abortion.  Both cases provided 
Justice Kennedy with an opportunity to readdress the undue burden framework found in Casey.  
Justice Kennedy took the bait and capitalized on an opportunity to modify his previously 
announced constitutional principle, yet did so under the veil of adhering to stare decisis.   
 In Stenberg v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy found himself on the dissenting side of a split 
Court.115  The majority held that it was unconstitutional for a Nebraska statute to criminalize partial 
birth abortions performed by physicians.116  The majority opinion written by Justice Breyer picked 
up on a particular phrase in Casey and discussed the application of Nebraska’s statute to two 
different types of partial birth abortion procedures.117 The statute was unconstitutional because it 
                                                 
liberty cautions with particular strength against reversing course.”) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 
855-56, 844). 
113 See id. at 564-73.  See also id. at 573 (noting the “deficiencies in Bowers”). 
114 Id. at 578. 
115 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
116 Id. at 929-30. 
117 Id. at 931-40.  See Id. at 930 (“ ‘subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in 
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except 
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lacked any exception for preserving the health of the mother and imposed an undue burden on the 
right of the mother to choose a partial birth abortion.118   
 Justice Kennedy dissented and was joined by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist.119  Justice 
Kennedy read the statute to apply to only one type of partial birth abortion procedure.120  He also 
read Casey to allow Nebraska and other states to weigh in on the abortion debate.121  The majority 
opinion, in the eyes of Justice Kennedy, misunderstood precedent and did not afford the proper 
respect to the state’s interests that Casey sought to protect in adjusting the Roe trimester 
framework.122  Justice Kennedy took the position that if the statute applied to both types of partial 
birth abortions, then the inquiry should end; Nebraska should not also be required to provide a 
health exception.123  Justice Kennedy ultimately determined that the state could rightfully restrict 
the types of procedures used to perform an abortion in respect for human life and its potential, and 
restricting such procedures does not unduly burden a woman the right to an abortion.124  
 In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court was tasked with deciding whether a similar federal partial 
birth statute restricted a woman’s right to an abortion.125  Because the statute was more specific 
than the statute in Stenberg and better addressed the issues the Court had in Stenberg, Justice 
                                                 
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health 
of the mother.’ ”) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65)). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 956. 
120 Id. at 960-64, 973-78. 
121 Id. at 961. 
122 Id. at 960-61. 
123 Id. (opining that Justice O’Connor went too far in her concurrence, when she required an 
exception to be written into the statute that would allow such procedures if the mother’s health 
was at risk). 
124 Id. at 956-57. 
125 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007). 
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Kennedy sided with the majority of the Court that found the statute constitutional.126  Of particular 
importance, Justice Kennedy stated:  
The principles set forth in the joint opinion in…[Casey] did not find 
support from all those who join the instant opinion.  Whatever one’s 
views concerning the Casey joint opinion, it is evident a premise 
central to its conclusion—that the government has a legitimate and 
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life—would be 
repudiated were the Court now to affirm the judgments of the Courts 
of Appeals [that found that the statute was unconstitutional for not 
having a medical exception, placed and undue burden on a woman’s 
right to an abortion later in her pregnancy, and was void for 
vagueness].127 
 
Justice Kennedy continued where he left off in Stenberg.  He fleshed out the third prong of the 
undue burden framework, habitually citing to Casey and his opinion written in Stenberg to bolster 
his decision.128  Specifically, Justice Kennedy read the statute to restrict only one type of abortion 
procedure, not two types of procedures.129  Justice Kennedy and the majority found that in the face 
of medial uncertainty as to “whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s 
health,” the legislature could properly determine that the procedure should not be used in situations 
to prevent a health risk to the woman.130  Other alternative procedures were available in such 
situations.131  The statute, in Justice Kennedy and the majority’s view, did not impose an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.132 
                                                 
126 Id. at 168. 
127 Id. at 144-46. 
128 Id. at 145-67 (“[T]he state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in 
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.  These 
principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.”) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 
846). 
129 Id. at 147-54. 
130 Id. at 161-67. 
131 Id. at 167. 
132 Id. 
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  Admittedly, the holdings of Stenberg and Gonzales are hard to distinguished at first blush.  
However, Justice Kennedy’s views in both cases are consistent.  Taking a broader prospective on 
the two cases in the wake of Casey, Justice Kennedy was presented with an opportunity to again 
revisit the constitutional framework that would be applied to abortion cases.  However, the crux 
of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in both cases show that he is unwilling to substantially rework the 
analytical framework he previously crafted.  This is unlike other justices who would completely 
overturn Roe and its foundational constitutional principles.133  To Justice Kennedy, Stenberg and 
Gonzales closely mirror the tensions that were found in Casey: the difficult balance of the interests 
of the state in protecting life and potential life, and the privacy and familial interests inherent in a 
woman’s right to choose an abortion.  The unique nature of the partial birth cases offered Justice 
Kennedy a better means to highlight those complex tensions. 
 But in taking a more narrow prospective on the two cases, Justice Kennedy is modifying 
binding precedent and its underlying constitutional principles by allowing more attention to be 
drawn to the government’s interests in abortion cases.  What is most shocking about Stenberg and 
Gonzales is that Justice Kennedy attempts to operate under the veil of stare decisis in making this 
modification.  Casey highlighted the aforementioned tensions, but Casey afforded both sides 
comparable latitude.  Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Stenberg and Gonzales evidence a more 
conservative reading of abortion precedent and a slow erosion of the undue burden framework.  
Yet, Justice Kennedy continually claimed that he was following Casey in his decisions in Stenberg 
and Gonzales.  Perhaps the more conservative members of the Court persuaded Justice Kennedy 
to rethink his previous stance, or perhaps his desire for the correct constitutional principle overtook 
his stare decisis considerations.  Regardless of the reason, Stenberg and Gonzales are evidence 
                                                 
133 See id. at 169 (J. Thomas, joined by J. Scalia, concurring). 
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that something other than a strong stare decisis doctrine is important to Justice Kennedy.   The 
power behind the articulation of the stare decisis doctrine in Casey and Lawrence has dwindled to 
Justice Kennedy’s mere attempt to somewhat follow precedent and accord stare decisis no great 
binding strength. 
B. Justice Kennedy’s Exception to Stare Decisis 
 Justice Kennedy’s exception to stare decisis makes any of his attempts at adhering to the 
judicial doctrine of consistency seem feeble and insincere.  His exception to stare decisis is best 
seen in Parents Involved in Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, and best exemplified in the 
cases leading up to and including Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n.  Justice Kennedy’s 
exception to stare decisis allows him to not follow stare decisis when he disagrees in a non-
majority opinion with an underlying constitutional principle.  He is able to maintain this 
disagreement by continuing to author non-majority opinions, until a later case provides him with 
an opportunity to capitalize on his disagreement in a majority opinion.  In his subsequent majority 
opinion, he is then able to overrule the cases with which he previously disagreed.  Again, this 
shows that Justice Kennedy is not following stare decisis at any stage of his exceptional process. 
 Justice Kennedy’s exception to stare decisis is succinctly stated in Parents Involved in 
Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1.134  Here, two public school districts voluntarily adopted a 
student assignment system that relied on race to determine which school certain children could 
attend.135  The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, held that the school districts 
actions could not withstand strict scrutiny absent a showing of de jure segregation.136  Justice 
                                                 
134 Parents Involved in Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
135 Id. at 709. 
136 Id. at 748 (“For schools that never segregated on the basis of race…or that have removed 
vestiges of past segregation…the way to achieve a system of determining admission to the 
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Kennedy authored a concurring opinion in which he could neither fully agree with Chief Justice 
Roberts because of his treatment of the Equal Protection Clause, nor join in Justice Breyer’s dissent 
because of his “misuse and mistaken interpretation of our precedents.”137  Of particular relevance, 
Justice Kennedy chastised the dissent for relying on concurring and dissenting opinions found in 
Gratz v. Bollinger138 and Grutter v. Bollinger139 to support the dissent’s reasoning:  
If today’s dissent said it was adhering to the views expressed in the 
separate opinions in Gratz and Grutter, that would be 
understandable, and likely within the tradition — to be invoked, in 
my view, in rare instances — that permits us to maintain our own 
positions in the face of stare decisis when fundamental points of 
doctrine are at stake.”140   
 
Justice Kennedy continued to write that the majority opinions in Gratz and Grutter cannot be 
reconciled with the position of the dissent in Parents Involved.141  Justice Kennedy would hold that 
the school districts should continue to be able to do the important work of bringing different types 
of students together, but should not do so based on racial classifications alone.142 
 Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion in Parents Involved that revealed his 
exception to stare decisis: a justice can cite or write a dissenting or concurring opinion in one case, 
follow that non-majority opinion in a subsequent case, and escape stare decisis altogether.  A 
justice would not be bound to follow a majority opinion and could follow his own views on 
fundamental constitutional principles. By doing so, this justice would then not be adhering to the 
                                                 
public school on a nonracial basis is to stop assigning students on a racial basis.  The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
137 Id. at 782. 
138 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
139 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
140 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 792. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 789, 798. 
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doctrine of stare decisis at all.  Stare decisis would be an afterthought in a justice’s personal 
crusade for the correct constitutional principle in which he agrees. 
 It is not surprising that the Supreme Court retains a tradition of maintaining one’s opinion 
through dissenting or concurring opinions.  After all, the point of authoring non-majority opinions 
is to dispute the other justices’ reasonings.  However, the impact of of this practice for Justice 
Kennedy, the swing-vote on today’s Court, is profound.  The best example of the impact of his 
stare decisis exception is Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n and its predecessors, Austin v. 
Mich. State Chambers of Commerce and McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n.   
 In Austin v. Mich. State Chambers of Commerce, the Court considered whether a section 
in the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violated the First or the Fourteenth Amendments because 
of its restrictions on corporate expenditures from general treasury funds for use in politica l 
campaigns.143  The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Marshall, held that the state statute was 
constitutional because the provision was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest of 
preventing financial quid pro quo 144  and “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and have little or 
no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”145  The majority opinion 
loosely cited to Buckley v. Valeo 146  and First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 147  for the 
aforementioned constitutional principles.148   
                                                 
143 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990). 
144 “Financial quid pro quo” means that a donor could give money to a campaign with the explicit 
or implicit understanding that the donor would receive some sort of “kick back” or reward from 
the candidate in the future. 
145 Id. at 655, 660. 
146 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
147 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).  
148 See generally Austin, 494 U.S. at 655-69 (J. Marshall, majority, citing Buckley approximately 
three times and Bellotti approximately four times). 
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 Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Justices O’Connor and Scalia, and argued that the 
majority opinion not only allowed an unconstitutional content based restriction on a corporation’s 
right to speech, but egregiously upheld “a direct restriction on the independent expenditure of 
funds for political speech for the first time in history.”149  Justice Kennedy substantially relied on 
Buckley and Bellotti, cases he considered more than persuasive precedent, when he opined that 
neither the state nor the majority could properly explain how such a restriction furthers a 
compelling government interest when the Court has continuously rejected the argument that 
independent expenditures do not foster political corruption.150  Further, the First Amendment seeks 
to protect speech, not allow restrictions based on the identity of the speaker and its financ ia l 
abilities.151  It is natural, and in fact encouraged in our Constitution, for people to pool their ideas 
and voices to form one association or organization.152 Simply stated, “associations do not suddenly 
present the specter of corruption merely by assuming the corporate form.”153  Justice Kennedy and 
his fellow dissenters would hold that the Michigan statute was unconstitutional and remove the 
“unhappy paradox” the Court constructed when it comes to protecting political speech.154 
 In McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, the Court was asked to decide whether provisions 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BRCA), a federal statute that was crafted to 
                                                 
149 Austin, 494 U.S. at 695. 
150 Id. at 702-05.  See generally id. at 695-713 (J. Kennedy, dissenting, citing Buckley 
approximately eight times and Bellotti approximately seven times). 
151 Austin, 494 U.S. at 699, 704-06. 
152 Id. at 709-13. 
153 Id. at 713 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
154 Id. at 713 (“It is an unhappy paradox that this Court, which has the role of protecting speech 
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unconstitutional].”) (internal citations omitted). 
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better combat new electioneering improprieties, were constitutional under the First Amendment.155  
The complex opinion was announced by several members of the Court and spanned three different 
authored sections, but followed in the same reasoning of Austin in upholding restrictions on 
corporations’ independent expenditures to political campaigns.156  Justice Kennedy continued to 
disagree with the reasoning and holding of Austin in his concurring  in part and dissenting in part 
opinion: “In the end the majority can supply no principled basis to reason away Austin’s anomaly. 
Austin’s errors stand exposed, and it is our duty to say so.”157  Once again substantially relying on 
Buckley and Bellotti, Justice Kennedy iterated that financial quid pro quo was not a governmenta l 
concern that justified the restrictions placed on corporations.158  Further, even the appearance of 
the potential for financial quid pro quo was not a compelling government interest that further 
justified the restriction.159  Justice Kennedy did not follow in Austin’s footsteps in his non-majority 
opinion in McConnell when he stated that: “The Court, upholding multiple laws that suppress both 
spontaneous and concerted speech, leaves us less free than before. Today's decision breaks faith 
with our tradition of robust and unfettered debate.”160 
                                                 
155 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003) (noting the “increased 
importance of of soft money, the proliferation of issue ads, and the disturbing findings of a 
Senate investigation into campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
156 Id. at 114.  See id. at 263 (“The federal election campaign laws, which are already (as 
today's opinions show) so voluminous, so detailed, so complex, that no ordinary citizen dare run 
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157 Id. at 325-29.  The anomaly being that Bellotti and the First Amendment afford the rights of 
free speech to whatever the form of speaker and its financial abilities, and Austin took the 
opposite view without overruling Bellotti and Buckley.  See id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 329. 
160 Id. at 340-41. 
   26 
 An opportunity to right the Court’s path came when Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n.161   The Court once again discussed the 
constitutionality of various portions of BCRA and the effects that Austin and McConnell had on 
corporate political speech.162  Justice Kennedy and the majority held that: 
Austin was a significant departure from ancient First Amendment 
Principles[… We] hold that stare decisis does not compel the 
continued acceptance of Austin.  The Government may regulate 
corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.163   
 
He next reviewed the flawed reasoning of Austin and McConnell:  “The ongoing chill upon speech 
that is beyond all doubt protected makes it necessary in this case to invoke the earlier precedents 
[Buckley and Bellotti] that a statute which chills speech can and must be invalidated where its 
facial invalidity has been demonstrated.”164  Then, Justice Kennedy turned to the effect of stare 
decisis would have on the majority opinion in Citizens United: 
Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of 
reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is 
sure error.  Beyond workability, the relevant facts in deciding 
whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the 
antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of 
course whether the decision was well reasoned.  We have also 
examined whether experience has pointed up the precedent’s 
shortcomings.165 
 
                                                 
161 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  The opportunity for Justice 
Kennedy to write the majority opinion in Citizens United could have easily come from his 
second-most senior position on the Court.  See supra text accompanying note 46. 
162 Id. at 319. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 336. 
165 Id. at 362-63. 
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Most interesting is that Justice Kennedy did not cite to Casey in his analysis of stare decisis, but 
instead chose to rely on Payne v. Tennessee166 for his stare decisis analysis.167  He briefly went 
through each of the aforementioned stare decisis considerations to determine that: 
Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin is now overruled.  
We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that 
the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of 
the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest 
justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations. 
 
* * * 
 
Given our conclusion we are further required to overrule the part of 
McConnell…[that] relied on the anti distortion interest recognized 
in Austin to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the 
restriction upheld in Austin, and we have found this interest 
unconvincing and insufficient.  This part of McConnell is now 
overruled.168 
 
After citing to his own opinion in McConnell, Justice Kennedy announced that the majority viewed 
the restrictions on corporate independent expenditures as unconstitutional and the disclaimer and 
disclosure requirements as constitutional.169 
 This line of First Amendment cases best shows the impact of Justice Kennedy’s exception 
to stare decisis.  Through two opinions in which he dissented and/or concurred, Justice Kennedy 
made his disagreement with a fundamental principle of constitutional law known.  Where he 
disagreed with precedent once (Austin), Justice Kennedy disagreed with precedent again 
(McConnell) in a non-majority opinion and circumvented the doctrine of stare decisis (McConnell 
and Citizens United) by citing to his previous opinions.  He could dispute the correctness of the 
                                                 
166 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).  It is interesting that this case predates Casey 
and its stare decisis analysis. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 363-66. 
169 Id. at 372. 
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previously announced constitutional principle and follow his own beliefs in the face of stare 
decisis in later opinions.  To make matters worse, Justice Kennedy’s subsequent majority opinion 
allowed him to overrule the cases in which he disagreed.  Further, Justice Kennedy became the 
second most senior member on the Court at the time Citizens United was decided, thereby 
providing him with a more influential role in Supreme Court decision-making.170  It is perhaps his 
newly acquired position of power coupled with his disagreement with precedent that made Justice 
Kennedy the perfect author for the majority opinion in Citizens United. 
 Also, the manner in which Justice Kennedy discussed stare decisis in Citizens United is 
noteworthy.  His stare decisis methodology changed since Casey, and in fact, he never once cited 
to Casey during his analysis of stare decisis in Citizens United.  Further, the Court overruled Austin 
and McConnell in a matter of a few paragraphs, as opposed to the multiple of pages spend 
discussing stare decisis in Casey. The two lengthy cases in which Justice Kennedy overruled in 
Citizens United certainly warranted more than a flippant discussion.  Similar to Stenberg and 
Gonzales (and to a lesser extent, Casey and Lawrence), Justice Kennedy was driven to state the 
correct constitutional principle.  It is perhaps because of the overwhelming strength of this drive 
seen in Citizens United that his strong attempts at adhering to stare decisis have eroded.  Justice 
Kennedy’s exception to stare decisis and its profound impact make his attempt to follow a strong 
judicial doctrine of consistency look very feeble and insincere. 
 
C. The Future Impact of Justice Kennedy’s Exception to Stare Decisis 
                                                 
170 See supra text accompanying note 46.  As the second-most senior member of the Supreme 
Court, Justice Kennedy can decide who writes the opinion if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Scalia do not agree with him. 
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 Throughout an exploration into Justice Kennedy’s approach to stare decisis, one must  also 
consider his most notorious characteristic: his moderate, middleman position on today’s Supreme 
Court.  Citizens United provided him with an opportunity to decisively exercise his swing vote 
through use of his exception to stare decisis.  Two areas of constitutional law give hint at the 
possibility of Justice Kennedy’s use of his exception to stare decisis in future controversial cases.  
Justice Kennedy may ensure that more “famously frustrating”171 5-4 controversial cases are on our 
legal system’s horizon.  Future Supreme Court litigates would be wise to take note. 
 The first area relates to the First Amendment and Establishment Clause.  In Cty. of 
Allegheny v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, the Court decided whether 
two holiday displays, one a crèche and the other a menorah, placed outside local government 
buildings violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.172  Justice Blackmun announced the decision of the Court 
that the placement of the crèche was unconstitutional and the placement of the menorah was not 
unconstitutional through the three Lemon173 tests coupled with more recent refinements of Lemon 
found in Lynch v. Donnelly.174 Justice Kennedy authored an opinion that concurred in part and 
dissented in part.175   Justice Kennedy first attacked Justice Blackmun’s reliance on the three 
Lemon tests:  
                                                 
171 See supra text accompanying note 68. 
172 Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 587-
88 (1989). 
173 So named from the tests’ announcement in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 
(1971).  See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (stating the Lemon tests as “a statute or practice 
which touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, must 
have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary 
effect; and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion”). 
174 Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579, 601-02, 620. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
175 Id. at 655. 
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I am content for present purposes to remain within the Lemon 
framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone 
adopting, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area.  
Persuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged…Substantial revision 
of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order…176 
 
Justice Kennedy found that both the crèche and the menorah are permissible displays in the context 
of the holiday season celebrations, even with use of the Lemon tests in a First Amendment 
Establishment Clause analysis.177  
 The second area relates to the Sixth Amendment.  In Ring v. Arizona, 178  the Court 
discussed the continued applicability of Walton v. Arizona179 in light of a more recent decision, 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,180 and whether an aggregating factor to impose a maximum crimina l 
punishment may be found by a judge, or whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to decide 
if the aggregating factor exists.181  The majority opinion held that in light of Apprendi, Walton was 
no longer good law and that the jury must make a determination as to any aggregating factors 
before a court imposes a maximum criminal penalty.182  Justice Kennedy concurred in Ring and 
voiced his disagreement with the ruling of Apprendi.  However, “Apprendi is now the law, and its 
holding must be implemented in a principled way.  As the Court suggests, no principled reading 
of Apprendi would allow…[Walton] to stand.”183  Although he cautioned as to the extension of 
Apprendi, he acknowledged that Walton and Apprendi could not co-exist.184 
                                                 
176 Id. at 655-56. 
177 Id. 
178 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
179 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
180 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  In Apprendi, Justice Kennedy agreed with 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent and did not author his own opinion. 
181 Ring, 536 U.S. at 597. 
182 Id. at 603,  
183 Id. at 613. 
184 Id.  
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 Through these two cases, Justice Kennedy laid similar groundwork as found in Austin and 
McConnell.  The only difference between Cty. of Allegheny / Ring and Austin / McConnell is that 
his tone in the former cases evidence a more subtle disagreement with binding precedent.  
However, it is disagreement nonetheless.  He argued that the underlying constitutional princip les 
in both cases, announced in Lemon for the First Amendment and Apprendi for the Sixth 
Amendment, are incorrect.  His analysis to follow was an attempt to come to a resolution of the 
case, presenting a mixture of stare decisis adherence and use of his exception.  And one must not 
forget that Justice Kennedy penned concurring opinions in both cases that allows him latitude to 
further utilize his exception to stare decisis in the future.  Justice Kennedy, in fact, took some of 
this latitude in Town of Greece v. Galloway when he authored a majority opinion that partially 
abrogated Cty. of Allegheny.185  Yet, sufficient foundation is laid in Cty. of Allegheny and Ring 
for more abrogation and overruling to come.  Our legal system may soon see a decision similar to 
Citizens United in other areas of controversial constitutional law, particularly considering the great 
influence of Justice Kennedy’s second-most senior position on the Supreme Court.186 
 
Conclusion 
 As stated in Marbury v. Madison,187 it is for the Court to say what the law is.  Stare decisis 
is a judicial doctrine that aims to consistently say what the law is, despite a particular justice’s 
view of the correctness of the underlying constitutional principle.  But in trying to succinct ly 
answer whether Justice Kennedy follows stare decisis, I find myself in the confusing, perplexing 
                                                 
185 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811, 1820-22 (2014). 
186 See supra text accompanying note 46, text accompanying note 169. 
187 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
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world of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence and am left without an answer.  I, like many others, am 
famously frustrated by Justice Kennedy.   
 In sum, Justice Kennedy believes in a strong foundation for stare decisis.  He attempts to 
adhere to a strong foundation of the judicial doctrine when deciding whether to overrule or follow 
binding precedent.  But his exception to stare decisis allows him to escape stare decisis altogether.  
His exception makes it seem like he never had binding precedent in his way to a decision that he 
personally finds correct.  Considering Justice Kennedy’s influential role as the middleman on the 
Court and as the Court’s second most senior member, it is very likely that he could continue to 
author concurring or dissenting opinions in other areas of constitutional law.  This trend could 
occur until he finds an opportunity to author a majority opinion that overturns the decisions in 
which he disagrees, much like what Justice Kennedy did in Citizens United.   
 Once again, there is no fully gratifying, coherent theory to understanding Justice Kennedy.  
There is no quick and easy answer to Prof. Wefing’s questions and to the question of Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence, especially as it relates to stare decisis. 
